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RE Charlies question: Piaget wrote about three types of schemata that the child develops: behavioral schemata (organized patterns of behavior that are used to represent and respond to objects and experiences), symbolic schemata (internal mental symbols (such as images or verbal codes) that one uses to represent aspects of experience.), and operational schemata (internal mental activity that one performs on objects of thought). Ossorio wrote about use of the “three system system“, consisting of the IA diagram (a system for describing behavioral schemata), state of affairs system (a system for describing symbolic schemata), and the person concept (a system for describing the remaining factors impacting internal mental activity (i.e. dimensions of persons other than those expressed in IA) of human persons, or “h-objects“). According to Piaget, the earliest time that all three appear to generate any sort of meaningful self awareness way is during the pre-operational stage (ages 2-7 yrs) consisting in two parts 1. the “symbolic function sub-stage”(2-4 yrs), where children begin to demonstrate a capacity for symbolic thought and reasoning, and 2. the “intuitive thought sub-stage” (4-7 yrs), at which time children become curious about things they don’t yet know and become aware of the fact that hey already possess a vast amount of information without understanding exactly how they acquired it. So, if, we can take as a premise this developmental perspective of humans (h-objects) as a pcf for understanding the development of consciousness in persons, and, if Piaget is then a fair sort of developmental psychologist to start considering for this purpose, then we are faced with the following dilemma: either (a) consciousness does not require all three systems involved in the three-system-system described by Ossorio, or (b) we are not conscious until we are about 2 years old. I think Joe’s point about describing consciousness in terms of < I,S,W > might provide an answer in terms of (a).
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SA < 'Consciousness'> would need to be described in terms of its object(s) (e.g. thoughts, sensations, etc.), process(es)(e.g. thinking, perceiving, focusing, etc..), event(s) (e.g person x stopped paying attention, or person y was aware that they wanted a drink of water), and other state(s) of affairs (e.g “water quenches thirst”). When we think of that last one, it seems like it should be included as semantic knowledge, which would be located somewhere in the K parameter, but it could also influence the performance of a deliberate action via the KH parameter process (the know-how of quenching one’s thirst, by drinking the water instead of licking the glass) in a way that one is not exactly conscious of at the time of deliberation or deliberate action. So conscious thought would have to involve a whole host of non-conscious processes of this sort, in that even thinking about something requires that we have some learned schema (cognizance) of thinking that is not itself something we are particularly aware of. In terms of ‘consciousness of’ v.s. ‘consciousness as’, the question “what is consciousness?” becomes “at what point does ‘consciousness of’ become ‘consciousness as’?” It seems to follow a linear progression: 1. person p is not ‘conscious of’ process x, 2. person p is ‘conscious of’ process x, 3. person p is ”conscious as’ person p+x of’ process x, 4. person p is ‘conscious as’ person p+x, but is not ‘conscious of’ process x.
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This reply was modified 5 years, 10 months ago by
Erol Zeybekoglu.
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This reply was modified 5 years, 10 months ago by
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This reply was modified 5 years, 10 months ago by
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(possible)
PCF of a Good Leader:Person GL enacting a behavior that is considered by other members of a shared group to be beneficial to the group as a whole, which also results in an increased practice of that behavior and adoption or enhancement of said behavior as a shared social practice of the group.
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In DP, emotion terms denote a relationship, rather than the affect state of an individual.
For example, to say “P is afraid of x” is to say the relationship of P to x is such that “x is a perceived threat to P”.
This necessarily involves an appraisal of significance (e.g. “x is a threat”, rather than “x is a support”) which may or may not be based on affect appraisal (e.g. “x makes me feel tense”, rather than “x makes me feel relaxed”), but does not necessarily require an active affect state (e.g. “I fear x, so I try not to think about it too much”).
Jealousy and envy both seem to express a relational position one holds to another person, or at least, the personified version of a non-person (e.g. “I wish I could just lay down like that rug over there”). While sometimes we don’t envy the object we are jealous of (e.g. I’d like to lay down like the rug, but as me, not as the rug), it doesn’t change the fact that we envy a hypothetical “other” person (i.e. I, the person standing, envy a hypothetical version of myself that is lying down). So in that sense, it seems to involve some appraisal of a current status, and an additional appraisal of the same person as an “other” person, holding a different status, or place in the scheme of things.
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Lo and Behold!
